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 Abstract—During the past decade, the electronic healthcare (e-health) system has been 
evolved into a more patient-oriented service with smaller and smarter wireless devices. 
However, these convenient smart devices have limited computing capacity and memory 
size, which makes it harder to protect the user’s massive private data in the e-health 
system. Although some works have established a secure session key between the user and 
the medical server, the weaknesses still exist in preserving the anonymity with low energy 
consumption. Moreover, the misuse of biometric information in key agreement process 
may lead to privacy disclosure, which is irreparable. In this study, we design a dynamic 
privacy protection mechanism offering the biometric authentication at the server side 
whereas the exact value of the biometric template remains unknown to the server. And the 
user anonymity can be fully preserved during the authentication and key negotiation 
process because the messages transmitted with the proposed scheme are untraceable. 
Furthermore, the proposed scheme is proved to be semantic secure under the 
Real-or-Random Model. The performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme suits 
the e-health environment at the aspect of security and resource occupation. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
LECTRONIC healthcare (e-health) systems are getting increasingly popular in moving patients from 
hospital ward rooms into their homes. Many applications such as Home Health Monitoring (HHM) and 
Personal Health Records (PHRs) are developed in order to manage chronic diseases and enable patients’ 
self-care. During the last decade, Internet-capable terminals with smaller size have been replacing the 
old-fashioned desktops and medical equipment. Various handhold and wearable devices (e.g. tablets, smart 
watches and smart bands) may act as communicators, sensors and monitors with the advances in Internet of 
Things (IoT) technologies [1]. Usually, these devices are deployed on a patient’s body or in surrounding 
environments collecting real-time data, transmitting them to the remote server, and then to the clients. 
Diagnoses and emergency decisions can be made according to the received information and the personal 
electronic health records. In the e-health systems, for example, a patient suffering from a cardiac disease is 
equipped with a number of small sensors on her/his body to monitor some vital signs such as heart rate, blood 
pressure, blood oxygen level, etc. The medical sensors collect the physical data and then transmit them to a 
medical server. After receiving the physical data, the medical server establishes a PHR for each patient. So 
the doctor checks the patient’s PHR and gives a more accurate diagnosis for the patient according to the PHR 
and the continuous monitoring data collected by the sensors. Through the e-health system, the patients can 
enjoy the health care and medical treatment timely at home. Moreover, emergency circumstances such as a 
heart attack can be detected quickly and the patient’s life can be saved. 
However, the natural defect of wireless communications raises a big concern about privacy preserving in 
e-health services. As shown in Figure 1, most of the entities in the system are connected to each other 
wirelessly where the adversaries may extract numerous useful information by passive attacks. Tracing the 
origin of data is one of these means, which are easily overlooked. Generally speaking, the user’s location can 
be acquired and the login time and frequency can be derived immediately. Combined with some information 
by googling that particular place, it is easy to conclude the user’s job, work place, home address and many 
other information, which largely reduces the difficulty of guessing the real identity and the correct password 
E 
of the user. And when the least expected thing happens, unauthorized adversaries may get access to the 
patient’s current health condition, medical history and other binding information like mobile phone number 
and credit card number. The patient will suffer much more than the illness itself. Considering the worst 
condition, if the adversary has an attempt at harming the patient, she/he may modify the patient’s vital health 
information. And when these modified messages are transmitted to doctors, wrong prescription can be made 
and the patient’s life may be threatened.  
 
Since medical data are transmitted and exposed to the unsecured public network, the patients’ privacy is 
susceptible to several attacks [2]. To deal with this situation, authenticated key agreement schemes have been 
applied to provide mutual authentication and session key negotiation between the authorized user and the 
server with various technologies [3-8]. And the shared session key can be used to encrypt/decrypt the medical 
information over the public network to ensure the confidentiality and integrity of the data communications in 
an e-health system. 
In order to construct a secure session key as required, some key agreement schemes have been proposed 
[3-5]. Yoon and Yoo employed elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) to generate a shared session key [3]. Based 
on Chebyshev chaotic maps, Farash et al.’s scheme [4] achieved mutual authentication and key agreement 
between the user and the server. Das et al. applied passwords and smart cards to design a two-factor key 
agreement scheme with the help of hash functions [5]. However in 2014, two-factor key agreement schemes 
without adopting asymmetric primitives were proved to be not privacy-preserving, as they were unable to 
preserve the user anonymity [9]. Furthermore, if the user’s password is verified with a related value in the 
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Fig. 1. An application scenario and the potential attacks of the e-health.
smart card, these schemes are subject to smart card breach attacks [9]. Since user anonymity including the 
untraceability is not considered or not provided in above schemes [3-5], these key agreement schemes are not 
suitable for e-health systems. 
To achieve privacy-preserving in designing an authenticated key agreement scheme, one solution is 
applying public-key mechanisms. Li et al. adopted ECC to construct a key agreement scheme with user 
anonymity and the untraceability by using the technology of smart cards [6]. Tsai et al. also proposed a 
privacy preserving authentication scheme based on ECC [7], which was an improvement of Li et al.’s scheme 
[6]. Although both schemes realize user anonymity and the untraceability, they are not suitable for an 
e-health circumstance due to the usage of time-consuming operations such as the scalar multiplication and 
the point addition of an elliptic curve. And the smart sensors deployed in the e-health system cannot afford 
the large power consumption at the aspect of computation and communication, especially the wearable 
devices and implanted smart chips. So the time-consuming operations should be avoided in the design of 
authenticated key agreement schemes for an e-health system. In addition, Li et al.’s scheme [6] and Tsai et 
al.’s scheme [7] are both suffered from the smart card loss attack. 
Another approach is to perform a symmetric three-factor authentication, which means adding a step of 
matching biometric features to the scheme. Amin et al. [8] took a step in designing a secure three-factor key 
agreement scheme using biometrics, passwords and smartcards for e-health systems. Their scheme is 
efficient since only hash functions and biohash functions are involved. Though their scheme employs random 
numbers and biohash functions to achieve user anonymity, it fails to provide the untraceability. In theory, a 
lightweight three-factor key agreement scheme could be adaptable to the e-health system environment better 
with the help of biohash technology. However, the usage of the biometrics should be more careful in some 
existing schemes [3, 10-16], since the leakage of the biometrics could lead to more security problems. 
Moreover, it is also known that the biometric characteristics are not like passwords that can be changed at 
will. Once the biometric template is revealed, the damage to user’s privacy is irreparable. 
In 2009, Fan and Lin proposed an idea of truly three-factor authentication [17]. Their studies showed that 
the biometric characteristics should be verified at the server side rather than at the user’s smart card while the 
exact value of the biometric information remains unknown to the server. However, this idea is not easy to 
achieve. The difficulty lies not only in the aforementioned verification process, but also in the transmission 
forms of the biometric information to make sure that even if the adversary controls the entire communication 
channel, she/he is unlikely to obtain the user’s real identity or to find the connection between any two 
messages. 
In this study, we present a practical authenticated key agreement scheme, which can meet the security 
needs and the computational demands of e-health systems. We focus on solving the aforesaid problems in 
biometric authentication and key negotiation process and providing the user’s privacy effectively and 
efficiently. The main contributions of our work are described below. 
Secure biometric authentication on the server. In our proposed scheme, the medical server is 
responsible for checking the user’s validity. To prevent the server from knowing the biometric template, a 
random string is combined with it using the exclusive-or operation and then the two masked strings are 
matched at the server side instead of matching the real template with the biometric characteristic. Besides, all 
these masked strings are protected by hash or biohash functions during the authentication and key negotiation 
process. Thus, the medical server can verify the biometric characteristics without storing and obtaining the 
exact values in our design. 
Strong privacy protection. In the storage devices like smart cards and the database, the biometric 
templates are protected by random numbers, which makes sure that only the user has the possession of the 
real value. Aiming at anonymity and untraceability, a dynamic mechanism is proposed to break the linkage of 
the transmitted messages. The relevant values in the database and the smart card will be updated after each 
successful login. Furthermore, we have proved our scheme to be semantic secure under Real-or-Random 
Model.  
Efficiency. The proposed scheme is lightweight since only hash functions and biohash functions are 
adopted during the whole procedure. In addition, no verification process needs to be performed at the user 
side, which reduces the redundancy in authentication process.  
The rest of our paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the related work including a brief 
development history and some common mistakes in designing three-factor authentication schemes. We 
describe the detail of our proposed scheme in Section III and prove it to be secure under the Real-or-Random 
Model in Section IV. Section V shows the evaluation result of the proposed scheme. The paper is concluded 
in Section VI. 
II. RELATED WORK 
Public key cryptography has already been applied to control the access to the remote healthcare server. 
Three-factor schemes based on discrete logarithm problem [18, 19], extended chaotic maps [4, 10, 20] and 
bilinear pairing [11] have been proposed regardless of large computational cost. To reduce the execution time, 
many schemes based on ECC [3, 6, 7, 21-24] have been suggested. In 2009, Fan and Lin [17] proposed a 
three-factor authentication scheme using both asymmetric and symmetric cryptosystems which could meet 
most security needs. But Yeh et al. [21] showed that Fan and Lin’s scheme could not resist the insider attack 
and presented a new three-factor scheme based on elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). 
Unfortunately, Wu et al. [23] found some weaknesses in Yeh et al.’s scheme, such as useless user identity, no 
session key, no mutual authentication and suffering from impersonation attacks. And then they proposed 
another new scheme. Although these schemes have been improved gradually with better security and 
efficiency [24], the cost is still not low enough for the mobile devices and the smart chips, which are widely 
deployed in e-health systems.  
To solve this problem, many schemes adopted one-way hash functions to improve the efficiency [12-16, 25, 
26]. However, design flaws occurred more frequently in hash-based schemes than asymmetric ones. In 2010, 
Li and Hwang [12] proposed a three-factor authentication scheme by applying only hash functions. Soon 
after their publication, Li et al. [13] pointed out that the man-in-the-middle attack existed in their scheme. 
Later on, Das [14] claimed that Li and Hwang’s scheme had some disadvantages and then presented a new 
biometric-based scheme. Li et al.’s scheme was also improved by Das [14] for lack of password updating 
phase. However, An [15] pointed out that Das’s scheme suffered from the insider attack, the password 
guessing attack and the impersonation attack. An also presented an improved scheme. Unfortunately, Khan 
and Kumari [16] demonstrated that An’s scheme was vulnerable to the password guessing attack and other 
security failures occurred like lack of mutual authentication and user anonymity. Recently, some solutions 
using biohash functions have been proposed to balance the contradictory of security and efficiency in 
e-health systems [25, 26]. As only hash function and biohash function are involved, these schemes achieve 
high performance. 
In 2014, Wang and Wang [9] proved that the two-factor schemes adopting symmetric algorithms failed to 
preserve user anonymity. Additionally, they drew a conclusion that smart card breach attacks may break the 
entire system if the verification value is stored in the smart card. Through rigorous analysis, biometric 
features could be used to solve the problem. Many attempts have been proposed involving three-factor 
authentication techniques [3, 10-16]. But this method is not easy to accomplish. During our study of existing 
three-factor schemes, we witnessed many common misuses of biometric information. For example, great 
hidden hazards exist because of the biometric template is stored in the smart card or transmitted on an 
insecure channel without any protection [3, 10]. If the smart card is obtained by an adversary, the biometric 
template can be easily extracted by side-channel attacks or reverse engineering. The transmitted biometric 
data can be obtained by eavesdropping the communication channel. In some schemes, biometric information 
is used as a part of the input of a hash function [11-16]. In this situation, valid biometric data cannot pass the 
verification process unless they are exactly the same with the template in a tiny probability. Thus, these 
schemes cannot be put into practice.  
In fact, these misuses can be avoided by applying biohash functions into the scheme. The biohash function 
is designed to map an individual’s biometric feature to a specific binary string that has a tolerance of noise 
[27, 28]. It means that if the inputs are not exactly the same but in a bearable threshold, the outputs of the 
biohash function will be equal. Also, the biohash function holds one-way property like the hash function. 
There are many ideas proposed in the literature, such as error-correcting codes [29], fuzzy commitments [30], 
fuzzy extractors [27, 31] and fuzzy vaults [32, 33]. These algorithms have already been referenced in newly 
presented key agreement schemes. In 2011, Huang et al. [34] proposed a generic framework for three-factor 
authentication using fuzzy extractors. They claimed that their scheme could provide secure three-factor 
authentication and preserve user privacy. Later in 2014, Yu et al. [35] presented an improvement of Huang et 
al.’s framework by applying fuzzy vaults. More efficiency and practicality have been achieved in their 
approach; and they proved their scheme in the random oracle model.  
Apparently, applying biohash functions is just a proper way of using biometric information in the scheme. 
Some biohash-based authentication schemes cannot solve the problems of suffering the smart card breach 
attack and not providing the user anonymity [3, 10-16]. After analyzing the existing schemes, we draw a 
conclusion that the weakness lies in verifying biometric information stored in the smart card rather than on 
the server. Thus the server has no idea about whether the verification is performed correctly. In addition, the 
user’s anonymity including untraceability should be protected to provide strong privacy protection. If the 
adversary breaks into a database containing the user’s biometric templates, these data can be used as a 
dictionary to break other systems with similar structure. Although the biometric database is not revealed on a 
large scale like the identity and password databases, a prevention step should be taken before it really 
happens. 
III. OUR PROPOSED SCHEME 
Since our scheme only adopts hash functions and biohash functions, extra steps should be taken to meet the 
security needs of e-health systems. In this section, we first introduce a dynamic mechanism in our proposed 
scheme including a dynamic table maintained on the medical server. After that, the details of the scheme are 
presented. Some notations are used to describe the scheme clearly, as shown in Table I. 
TABLE I 
NOTATIONS USED IN THIS PAPER 
Notation Description 
Ui The ith user (could be a patient, a 
doctor or a relative) participates in a 
phase 
S The medical server of the e-health 
system 
IDi, PWi The identity and the password of Ui 
Ti, Bi The biometric template and the 
biometric data of Ui 
s The master key of the medical server 
IDSC The identity of the smart card 
rx High-entropy random numbers 
Cj The jth transmitted value in this 
scheme 
h() A collision free hash function 
hBio() A secure biohash function 
 A matching algorithm of biometrics 
 The exclusive-or operation 
|| The concatenation operation 
f() Dynamic strings generating 
algorithm 
Traditionally, an identity-password table is stored in the remote database offering verification at the server. 
The login request message usually consists of a pair of the identity and the password or its hash value. After 
receiving the login message, the server searches for the identity in the database and then compares the 
corresponding password or the hash value with the receiving string. However, this table structure is likely to 
suffer from the stolen verifier attack and the insider attack, let alone the violence of the user anonymity and 
untraceability. To deal with these weaknesses, a dynamic verification table and a new authentication process 
are presented in our scheme as shown in Figure 2.  
 
The login request message contains the user’s biometric feature Bi which has just been scanned on the 
remote terminal and combined with the random number ri (extracted from the smart card) by using an 
exclusive-or operation. With the help of another random number rj, a dynamic string generated by a 
particular algorithm f() is also included to locate the corresponding masked biometric template Tiri in the 
database. Here f() is a one-way and collision-free algorithm. Then the server matches two masked strings 
Biri and Tiri. If the result is beyond a bearable threshold, the server aborts the session.  Otherwise, a new 
random number rj' is generated for next login and f(rj) is replaced by f(rj') in the database. Meanwhile the 
smart card updates the random number rj with rj'. Note that Biri in the login request message and rj' in the 
response message are not in plaintext during the transmitting process.  
Fig. 2. A biometric authentication process on the server in our proposed
scheme. 
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 In the proposed dynamic mechanism, the user’s biometric characteristics are not exposed to the server 
whereas the verification process can still be performed successfully. Even if the dynamic verification table is 
stolen, the adversary cannot obtain the biometric templates. Furthermore, a new random number will be 
generated after every successful login preparing for next conversation. The linkage in the messages that come 
from the same user has been greatly reduced due to its randomness. Thus, the users in this mechanism are 
anonymous and untraceable literally. Next, we describe the details of our proposed dynamic authentication 
and three-factor key agreement scheme for e-health systems, as shown in Figure 3.  
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the details of our scheme. 
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A. Registration Phase 
In order to be a legal member of the system, a new user Ui needs to register with the medical server S by 
performing the following three steps. Thereafter, the user Ui is issued with a smart card; the medical server S 
stores the protected biometric information of the user Ui in its database. 
Step R1: the user Ui chooses his/her identity IDi and password PWi which she/he can remember easily. The 
terminal device then acquires Ui’s biometric data Ti as a template and uses it to compute 
C1=h(IDi||PWi||hBio(Ti)). Next, the terminal device masks the user Ui’s biometric template Ti with a random 
integer r1 by computing C2=Tir1. Then the user Ui sends {C1,C2} as a registration request message to the 
medical server S in a secure channel. 
Step R2: after receiving the registration request from the user Ui, the medical server S combines its master 
key s with Ui’s private information C2 by calculating M=h(hBio(C2)||s). For the further verification process, 
the medical server S selects another random integer r2 and computes W=h(hBio(C2r2)), X=h(IDsc|| C1||M)r2 
and Y=MC1. Next the medical server S stores {C2, W0, W} in its database where W0 equals NULL. Then the 
medical server S writes {IDsc, h(), hBio(), X, Y } into the smart card. And the smart card is delivered to the 
patient user Ui in a secure way. 
Step R3: the user Ui writes Z=r1hBio(Ti) into the receiving smart card, thus finishing the registration phase 
successfully.  
B. Login Phase 
The user Ui needs to perform the following operations in order to be authenticated by the medical server S 
when the user Ui wants to get some information from the medical server S. 
Step L1: the user Ui inputs her/his identity IDi and password PWi into the terminal device and then allows a 
scan to gain the patient user Ui’s biometric information Bi. Also, the user Ui should insert her/his smart card 
into the terminal card reader.  
Step L2: next, the user Ui chooses a random integer r3 and uses the messages stored in the smart card to 
compute some valuable information C1*=h(IDi||PWi||hBio(Bi)), M*=Yh(C1*), r2*=Xh(IDSC||C1*||M*) and 
r1*=ZhBio(Ti). 
Step L3: for the login request message, the smart card calculates C3=hBio(Bir1*r2*), C4=Bir1*h(M*||r3) 
and C5= r3hBio(Bir1*) and then sends {C3,C4,C5} to the medical server S.  
C. Authentication Phase 
This phase should be executed after the medical server receives a login request. The user Ui and the 
medical server S can authenticate each other and then negotiate a common session key SK by performing the 
following steps. 
Step A1: firstly, the medical server S searches W* in the dynamic verification table (shown in Fig. 4) and 
obtains the corresponding C2. The medical server S first searches the column “Dynamic string (W)”, and if a 
value equals to W*, the corresponding value in column “Biometric identity” will be extracted as C2. 
Otherwise, the medical server continues to search the column “Dynamic string (W0)” to see if a value equals 
to W*. If successful, the medical server extracts the corresponding value C2 and replaces W with the value of 
W0. Otherwise, the medical server S rejects the user Ui’s login request. 
 
Step A2: next, the medical server S generates a random number r4 and computes M'=h(hBio(C2)||s), 
r3*=C5hBio(C2) and Bir1*=C4h(M'||r3*). Then it checks if Bir1*andC2are within a bearable threshold [20]. 
The session is terminated immediately if the threshold is larger than a presupposed value. On the contrary, the 
medical server S sends {C6, C7} to the user Ui whereC6 equals to r4h(Bir1*) and C7 equals to 
h((Bir1*)||r3*||r4).  
Step A3: after receiving the information {C6, C7} from the medical server S, the user Ui computes 
Biometric 
Fig. 4. Our proposed dynamic verification table. 
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r4*=C6h(Bir1*) and verifies whether the equation C7=?h((Bir1*)||r3||r4*) holds or not. If the verification 
succeeds, the user Ui computes the session key SK=h(M*||r3||r4*) and Xnew=h(IDSC||C1*||M*)r4*. After that, 
the user Ui sends C8=h(hBio(Bir1*r4*)r4*) as a confirmation value to the medical server S. 
Step A4: after receiving the confirmation of the user, the medical server S checks the validity of C8 by 
comparing it with h(hBio(Bir1*r4)r4). If these two values are the same, the medical server S accepts the 
session key SK=h(M'||r3*||r4) and computes Wnew=h(hBio(C2r4)). Then it replaces (W0, W) with (W, Wnew) for 
the user Ui’s next login and sends C9=h(SK||r4) to the user as an acknowledgement. 
Step A5: after receiving C9 from the medical server, the user checks the validity of C9 by comparing it with 
h(SK||r4). If these two values are the same, the user accepts the session key SK and replaces X with Xnew in the 
smart card for next login. If the checking of C9 fails or the user does not receiveC9 in a given time, the session 
will be terminated immediately and the user will start another session.  
Finally, the user Ui and the medical server S authenticates each other and negotiates a common session key 
securely. Let SKu be the session key of the user and SKs represents the session key of the medical server. 
Suppose that the user and the medical server are legal. The scheme is correct if equation SKu=SKs holds. Then 
we have: 
SKu=h(M*||r3||r4*) 
=h(YC1*||r3||C6h(Bir1*) 
=h(MC1C1*||r3||r4h(Bir1*)h(Bir1*)) 
=h(M||r3||r4)  
=h(M||r3hBio(Bir1*)hBio(Tir1*)||r4) 
=h(h(hBio(C2)||s)||C5hBio(C2)||r4) 
=h(M'||r3*||r4)  
= SKs 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS 
In this section, we show that our proposed scheme is provably secure under Real-Or-Random Model. 
Moreover, some other security features are discussed in the last subsection.  
A. Security Model 
The security model of password-based authenticated key exchange protocol has been introduced by 
Bellare et al. [36]. We extended their model into a three-factor one by adding some new oracles in Abdalla et 
al.’s Real-or-Random Model [37]. Those definitions are described below. 
Participants. Let U be the set of users and S be the set of servers. The set of all participants P is the union 
of U and S. The symbol u represents an instance of U and s denotes an instance of S. Any participant instance 
p of set P is an oracle.  
Partnering. Session identifications (sid) are unique for each key agreement conversation in practice. We 
say that u and s are partnered if these two instances share the same non-null session identifications (sidu).  
Adversary. The adversary A in this model runs in polynomial time. The ability of the adversary A is 
defined by the following queries. 
Execute(u, S): This query models the eavesdropping attacks and returns a copy of the messages transmitted 
between u and its partner S during their last authentication conversation.  
Send(p, m): The adversary sends a message m to p and receives a respond message in this query. It models 
the active attacks such as replay attacks, modification attacks and impersonation attacks.  
CorruptSC(u): This query returns the current information stored in u’s smart card to simulate the smart 
card lost attacks such as offline password guessing attacks with smart card. 
CorruptDB(s): The current table {C2, W0, W} of s will be returned to the adversary when she/he queries the 
instance s. The stolen verifier attack is simulated by this query. 
Note that in CorruptSC and CorruptDB queries, only the current information will be delivered since the 
data stored in the smart card and the database changes dynamically.  
Test(u/S): The semantic security of the session key is simulated by flipping an unbiased coin b in Test 
query. The instance u returns a random binary string if the hidden bit b=0 or the session key if b=1. If the 
adversary asks many Test queries, the output should be based on the same value of b. 
Hash(x, h(x)): The Hash oracle searches for x in its table when one makes a query and returns h(x) if x 
exists; otherwise, it returns a uniformly random string k and stores {x, k} in the table.  
Biohash(x, hBio(x)): When a query with x is made, the Biohash oracle compares every existing element x* 
with x and returns hBio(x) if the number of different bits between x* and x is within a threshold value; 
otherwise, a uniformly random string k is returned and {x, k} is stored in the table. 
Semantic security. Providing the above queries, the adversary A may interact with the instances to help 
she/he determine the value of bit b. If she/he guesses correctly, the scheme fails to provide semantic security. 
Let Succ denote the event that A wins. A has an advantage Advake(A)=|2Pr[Succ]-1| in breaking the semantic 
security of the scheme. If Advake(A) is negligible, the scheme is secure under the Real-Or-Random Model.  
B. Formal Analysis in Real-Or-Random Model 
Theorem 1: Let D1, D2 and D3 be uniformly distributed dictionaries of user identity, password and 
biometric template, respectively. |D1|, |D2| and |D3| denote the size of D1, D2 and D3. Then we have: 
Advake≤ qh
2
|H1| +
qb
2
|H2| + max ቊ
2qs
|D1|·|D2|·|D3| ,
qt
2l-1·|T|ቋ , 
where qh, qb and qs denote the number of Hash queries, Biohash queries and Send queries, respectively. |H1|, 
|H2| and |T| denote the range space of the hash function, the range space of the biohash function and the 
number of the items in the server’s table, respectively. qt is the number of A’s guessing attempt towards the 
server. As the matter of fact, |D3| is much larger than |D1| and |D2|. 
Proof: Let Succi be the event that the adversary A wins game Gi. In each game, A is supposed to guess the 
hidden bit b which is chosen before the starting game G0. 
Game G0: This game models a real attack by the adversary A. According to definitions above, we have:  
Advake(A) = 2Pr[Succ0] – 1.             (1) 
Game G1: To increase the advantage of winning, the adversary A launches an eavesdropping attack by 
querying the Execute(u, S) oracle. Then A has to decide the value of b in the Test(u/S) oracle. Since the 
session key SK is computed by M, r3 and r4, A tries to extract these values from {C3,…,C9}. According to 
section III, we know that M=Yh(IDi||PWi||hBio(Bi))=h(hBio(C2)||s), r3=C5hBio(C2) and r4=C6h(Bir1). 
Therefore, A cannot compute SK before corrupting the smart card or the server’s database. The identity, the 
password and the biometric template of user and server’s master key remain unknown. Thus, the 
eavesdropping attack does not provide any advantage compared to game G0 and we get: 
Pr[Succ1] = Pr[Succ0].                (2) 
Game G2: We transfer game G1 to this game by adding a Send query to simulate an active attack. Hash 
oracle and Biohash oracle also need to create fabricate messages. No collisions will be found while querying 
Hash oracle and Biohash oracle because every message contains some different random factors such as 
biometric information and random numbers. By using the birthday paradox, we have:  
หPrሾSucc2ሿ‐ Pr[Succ1]ห≤qh2 2∙|H1|+ൗ qb2 2∙|H2|⁄ .      (3) 
Game G3: In this game, the adversary A queries the CorruptSC oracle and the CorruptDB oracle. Game G3 
is transformed from game G2. 
Case 1: the adversary A receives IDSC, X, Y and Z stored in the user’s smart card by querying the CorruptSC 
oracle. Then A tries a dictionary attack with the possible identity, password and biometric information of the 
user in D1, D2 and D3. Since the scale of the dictionary is |D1||D2||D3|, the dictionary attacks are not available. 
Thus, we have:  
หPrሾSucc3ሿ- Pr[Succ2]ห ≤ qs |D1|·|D2|·|D3|.ൗ        (4) 
Case 2: Instead of querying the CorruptSC oracle, the CorruptDB oracle is queried to simulate a stolen 
verification table attack. After receiving the server’s table {C2,W0,W}, the adversary A tries every C2 in it and 
starts a different online dictionary attack by calculating M=h(hBio(C2)||s), C4*=C2h(M ||r) and C5*=rhBio(C2) 
where r is a randomly chosen number. C3* is left for the Biohash oracle and Send(s, {C3*, C4*, C5*}) is queried. 
A uses a random string with l bits to replace the server’s master key s; so we have:  
หPrሾSucc3ሿ- Pr[Succ2]ห ≤ qt 2l·|T|⁄ .           (5) 
The adversary A can choose case 1 or case 2 as the last game G3. From game G0 to game G3, all the oracles 
are simulated and A has no choice but querying the Test oracle and guessing the bit b in the last game. 
Therefore,  
Pr[Succ3] = 1/2.                    (6) 
Combining equations (1)-(4) and (6), we have: 
Advake≤ qh
2
|H1| +
qb
2
|H2| +
2qs
|D1|·|D2|·|D3| . 
And combining equations (1)-(3) and (5)-(6), we have: 
Advake≤ qh
2
|H1| +
qb
2
|H2| +
qt
2l-1·|T|. 
Thus, Advake≤ qh2|H1| +
qb
2
|H2| + max ൜
2qs
|D1|·|D2|·|D3| ,
qt
2l-1·|T|ൠ . 
The adversary doesn’t have a non-negligible advantage since |H1|, |H2|, |D1||D2||D3| and 2l-1|T| are beyond 
the polynomial time. The proposed scheme provides semantic security in our security model. 
C. Discussion on possible attacks 
In this subsection, we discuss the security of our proposed protocol by analyzing some possible attacks. 
Some possible attacks have already been analyzed by Real-or-Random Model in the former subsection B 
such as replay attacks, modification attacks and impersonation attacks by Send oracle. We omit the analysis 
of these attacks and focus on some attributes we have not discussed in detail like the resistance to 
man-in-the-middle attacks, perfect forward secrecy, biometric protection etc. The following discussion 
shows how our proposed scheme resists the possible attacks. 
Resistance to man-in-the-middle attacks. In our scheme, a session key SK is established between the 
user Ui and the medical server S only after the mutual authentication. In order to make an independent 
connection with the medical server S, the adversary A needs to deliver a legal login request message {C3, C4, 
C5} to pass the verification process of the medical server S. However, without any knowledge of C1X, Y, IDSC 
and Bir1, the adversary A cannot construct a legalC3. If the adversary A cannot forge a legal C3 called C3', 
the server S will reject the login request for no corresponding C2 is found using the W '=h(C3'). Even if the 
adversary A constructs a legal C3, this attack can be found when the server compares the computed value of 
Bir1* and the value of C2 from the dynamic verification table. That because without the knowledge of Ui’s 
biometric data Bi and the master key s of the server, the adversary A cannot generate legal C4 and C5 to pass 
the verification process of the server S. For the same reason, the adversary A cannot make an independent 
connection with the user Ui. Since the adversary A does not know the Bir1* and r3, she/he is not able to 
generatevalidC6 and C7 to pass the verification process of the user Ui. Thus, the adversary A cannot construct 
independent connections with either the medical server S or the user Ui. If the adversary A tries to be a man in 
the middle to communicate with Ui and S independently, the Ui and S will detect the error and terminate the 
session immediately. The above analysis shows that the proposed scheme can resist the man-in-middle 
attack. 
Resistance to offline password guessing attacks with/ without smart cards. Assuming an adversary A 
intercepts all the messages transmitting between the user Ui and the medical server S, and launches an offline 
dictionary attack. Since none of the transmitted messages {C3, …, C9} possesses the user Ui’s password PWi, 
the adversary A cannot determine whether each of she/he guessed passwords is correct or not via the 
intercepted messages {C3, …, C9}. Therefore, the adversary A cannot perform the offline dictionary attack 
without smart cards successfully. 
Considering another case, the adversary A compromises the secret information {IDSC, h(), hBio(), X, Y, Z} 
stored in the smart card of Ui and launches the offline dictionary attack with smart cards. Compared with the 
offline dictionary attack without smart cards, the addition information known by A in this attack is {IDSC, 
h(), hBio(), X, Y, Z}. In order to obtain Ui’s password PWi, the adversary needs to compromise C1from X or Y. 
Since C1is protected by a high entropy random integer r2, the secret message M and one way hash function, 
the adversary A cannot guess C1 correctly. Furthermore, the adversary A cannot obtain C1 from Y without the 
knowledge of M=h(hBio(C2)||s) which is constructed by medical server’s master key s and C2. Even if the 
adversary A obtain C1=h(IDi|| PWi||hBio(Ti)), she/he cannot guess the user Ui’s password PWi successfully 
without the knowledge of Ui’s biometric data Ti and identity IDi. Thus, the offline password guessing attack 
with/without smart cards cannot violate our proposed scheme. 
Resistance to de-synchronization attacks. In the proposed scheme, after the medical server S computes 
SK, it sends an acknowledgement message C9 to the user. If the user receives the acknowledgement message, 
it stores the computed SK as the shared session key. If the message C8 or C9 is blocked, the user will not 
receive the acknowledgement message C9 in a given time. In this case, the user will delete SK and restart the 
login and authentication process. And during the restart authentication phase, the medical server searches W* 
in the dynamic verification table and obtains the corresponding C2 by using the matched value W0 (old value). 
So the user and the server can negotiate a shared session key in the restart authentication process. Thus, the 
proposed scheme can resist de-synchronization attacks. 
Resistance to stolen verifier attacks. In our scheme, the verifier is the current dynamic verification table 
which consists C2=Tir1, W=h(hBio(Tir1r2)), and W0. The W0 could be a value of NULL or a previous W. 
Suppose that the dynamic verification table is obtained by the adversary A. She/he guesses a secret key s' of 
the server and tries to computeC2'=C4h(h((hBio(C2)||s')||C5hBio(C2))by every C2 in the table where C4 and 
C5 are eavesdropped by the adversary A. Then the adversary A determines whether the computed C2' and the 
corresponding C2 are within a bearable threshold. Unfortunately, she/he will fail because the master key s of 
the medical server S is a high-entropy random number with a length of a secure parameter l. The chance of 
guessing a correct s can be ignored. Thus, the stolen verifier attack will not violate the session key. 
Furthermore, the biometric information is still safe under this circumstance according to our analysis in 
paragraph “Biometric protection” we state below. Therefore, our scheme can resist stolen verifier attacks.  
Resistance to insider attacks. On one hand, any malicious legal users will fail to impersonate other users, 
since they have to provide the correct biometric characteristic Bi of the targeted user. On the other hand, the 
dynamic verification table does not consist of any information about passwords and the real biometric 
information in the database. The scheme remains secure even if the entire table is leaked to the adversary 
according to the above formal proof in Real-or-Random Model. Therefore, any privileged-insiders of the 
medical server or any malicious legal users will find the insider attack is invalid in this scheme. 
Known key security. In the proposed scheme, the session key SK=h(M||r3||r4) is computed by M, r3 and r4. 
The r3 and r4 are two random integers which are generated by the user Ui and the medical server S 
respectively and independently for each session. Since r3 and r4are different in each session, the session key 
SK in each run of the proposed scheme is unique. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides known-key 
security. 
Perfect forward secrecy. In order to provide perfect forward secrecy, a dynamic verification table and a 
dynamic value stored in the smart card are designed in the proposed scheme. The adversary A can only get 
access to the current value rather than every previous ones. When the two private keys PWi and s are leaked, 
A cannot compute M since M=Yh(IDi||PWi||hBio(Bi))=h(hBio(C2)||s) without knowing the biometric feature Bi 
or verification list {C2, W0, W} stored at the server. Even if the verification list is stolen, the adversary A still 
fails to obtain the each-round session key SK=h(M||r3||r4) because A cannot extract the related temporary 
information r3 and r4. Therefore, the proposed scheme provides perfect forward secrecy. 
Biometric protection. In this scheme, attempts have been made to guarantee that the biometric feature Bi 
is possessed by only one entity, namely the user itself, which results in that the only way to acquire Bi is by 
scanning the user’s fingerprint or iris. The related values in the storage are Z=r1hBio(Ti) in the smart card and 
C2=Tir1 in the database on the medical server. The random number r1 cannot be known unless someone 
provides the right biometric characteristic and one of the related values Z or C2 is lost simultaneously. And 
the biometric template Ti cannot be retrieved by the related values Z or C2 unless someone correctly guesses 
the random number r1. Thus, the proposed scheme protects the privacy of the biometric successfully. 
User anonymity including the untraceability. Biological feature differs from person to person. In the 
proposed scheme, the biometric information acts as the identifier and provides higher anonymity since a jitter 
exists in the scan result of biometric features. Furthermore, a new random number r4 is generated by the 
medical server after every successful login. In the next login phase, C3 equals hBio(Bir1r4) and W equals 
hBio(C2r4). The random number r3 in C4 and C5 and the random number r4 in C6, C7 and C8 are generated 
again. Thus, the linkage in the messages depends on the randomness of the random numbers. Therefore, our 
proposed scheme achieves the user untraceability and the user anonymity can then be provided. 
V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON 
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our proposed scheme with other four related schemes [8, 19, 
21, 23] based on three-factor authentication. The computational cost and the communication cost in the login 
phase and the authentication phase are compared in detail and the security features of these schemes are also 
analyzed.  
In the proposed scheme, the traditional verification table is improved to form a dynamic one which can 
resist the stolen verifier attack and the insider attack. And the biometric characteristics are authenticated at 
the server side, which forbids the online dictionary attack. In addition, the value stored in the smart card 
cannot be used for the offline dictionary attack since they are combined with high-entropy integers. Even if 
the smart card is lost, no user information will be leaked out. As for the transmitting messages, the linkage 
between any two messages is broken by the implementation of high-entropy integers and the biometric 
information’s jitter. Thus anonymity and untraceability have been achieved. 
As shown in Table II, the related schemes [8, 19, 21, 23]have some design flaws and cannot satisfy all the 
security features. Yeh et al.’s scheme [21] focuses on preventing the insider attack, but suffers from the 
impersonation attack and fails to establish a secure session key. Wu et al.’s scheme [23] satisfies most of the 
security requirements, whereas they ignores the insider attack. Amin et al.’s scheme [8]cannot provide 
several security features since the replay attack is not prevented and the perfect forward secrecy is not 
satisfied. In Li et al.’s scheme [19], the smart card stores a value V=h(ID||h(PW||hBio(BD)) which could cause 
the offline smart card breach attacks and other problems. Furthermore, the schemes [8, 19, 21] suffered from 
de-synchronization attacks. Compared with the related works [8, 19, 21, 23], our proposed scheme can resist 
most of the known attacks and provides a number of attractive security features especially privacy protection. 
TABLE II 
COMPARISON OF SECURITY FEATURES BETWEEN OUR SCHEME AND OTHERS 
 
[2
1] 
[2
3] 
[8
] 
[1
9] 
Ou
rs 
Resistance to replay 
attacks 
Y Y N Y Y 
Resistance to 
impersonation attacks 
N Y Y Y Y 
Resistance to 
man-in-the-middle 
attacks 
N Y Y Y Y 
Resistance to 
modification attacks 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Resistance to password 
guessing attacks 
-- Y Y Y Y 
Resistance to smart card 
lost attacks 
-- Y Y N Y 
Resistance to 
online/offline dictionary 
attacks 
-- Y Y N Y 
Resistance to stolen 
verifier attacks 
Y Y Y Y Y 
Resistance to insider Y N Y Y Y 
attacks 
Resistance to 
de-synchronization 
attacks 
N Y N N Y 
Perfect forward secrecy N Y N Y Y 
Mutual authentication N Y Y Y Y 
Session key security -- Y Y Y Y 
User anonymity 
&untraceability 
-- Y N Y Y 
Biometric protection Y N N N Y 
Formal security 
analysis/proof 
N Y Y N Y 
The computational cost of our proposed scheme is also compared with other related schemes. We carried 
out a simulation of these schemes with OpenSSL Library on two different computers. The hardware platform 
for the user is Inter(R) Pentium(R) CPU G630 which offers maximum clock speeds of 2.70GHz and 4.00 GB 
memory. The server is given an Inter(R) Core(TM) i5-3337U CPU @ 1.80GHz and 4.00 GB memory. Those 
two PCs were connected with a switch to simulate a practical environment. The switch we adopted is H3C 
S1024R which ensures the bandwidth between any two connected network devices is 100Mbps. Each of the 
simulation was performed for 100 times and the average results are shown in Table III. The notation Th and 
Tbh denote the time for executing a one-way hash or biohash function respectively. And let Ts, Tm, Ta and Te 
be the time for executing a symmetric key encryption/decryption operation, the time for executing a scalar 
multiplication operation of an elliptic curve, the time for executing a point addition operation of an elliptic 
curve and the time for executing a modular exponentiation operation, respectively. The hash function we 
adopted is SHA-1 algorithm. And the biohash algorithm we used in our simulation is based on[38]. The 
length of the biometrics we used in our simulation is 160 bits. During the simulation of Li et al.’s scheme [23], 
we consider that the user’s private key is generated in the registration phase, otherwise the result would be 
incredible large. Table III shows computational comparisons between the proposed scheme and other related 
schemes in the login and authentication phases. Note that the registration phase just needs to be executed only 
once for a certain user. The login phase and the authentication phase should be performed every time when a 
certain user needs medical service. As shown in Table III, compared with other related schemes [19, 21, 23], 
our proposed scheme and Amin et al.’s scheme [8] have a great advantage on computational costs, which are 
0.0989 ms and 0.0819 ms respectively. That because only hash and biohash operations are adopted in our 
scheme and Amin et al.’s scheme.  
As shown in Figure 5, the computational costs in schemes [19, 21, 23] are much higher than our proposed 
scheme and Amin et al.’s scheme [8]. The reason can be concluded from Table III that those schemes 
involving heavyweight operations such as modular exponentiation operations and scalar multiplication 
operations of an elliptic curve. Thus they are not suitable for e-health systems due to the limited 
computational capability of the devices. Compared with Amin et al.’s scheme [8], the computational 
overhead of our scheme costs a little more to offer more security features such as perfect forward secrecy, 
mutual authentication, the user anonymity and the user untraceability which are not provided by Amin et al.’s 
scheme. 
TABLE III 
COMPARISON OF COMPUTATIONAL COST 
 Hash &Biohash operations 
Other 
operations 
Total execute 
time (ms) 
Yeh et al. [21] 3Th 4Tm+12Ta 3.4508 
Wu et al. [23] 12Th+1Tbh 4Tm+4Ts 3.2252 
Amin et al. [8] 10Th+1Tbh -- 0.0819 
Li et al. [19] 10Th+1Tbh 4Te 6.6610 
Ours 19Th+4Tbh -- 0.0989 
 The comparison of communication cost is shown in Table IV. In our experiments, the timestamp is 4 bytes 
(32 bits), the output of the hash function is 20 bytes (160 bits), the output of the biohash function and modular 
exponentiation operation are 32 bytes (256 bits) and a point of elliptic curve is 64 bytes (512 bits). In addition, 
the output of a 256 bit AES is based on the input of the plaintext. Yeh et al.’s scheme [21] takes the largest 
communication load which needs 448 bytes while Amin et al.’s scheme [8] takes the smallest load which is 
132 bytes. Wu et al.’s scheme [23] and Li et al.’s scheme [19] need 200 bytes and 144 bytes respectively. Our 
proposed scheme costs 164 bytes, which is 32 bytes more than the smallest; but it does not cause a large 
burden to the network obviously. Besides, the proposed scheme can resist various attacks and provide more 
security features. The performance on computational cost is also promising since only lightweight operations 
are used in the proposed scheme. Therefore, our proposed scheme is a successful authenticated key 
agreement protocol for e-health systems. 
TABLE IV 
COMPARISON OF COMMUNICATION COST 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
In this paper, we have proposed a three-factor authenticated key agreement scheme for e-health systems to 
protect the user’s privacy using a dynamic authentication mechanism. The introduction of performing the 
biometric authentication at the server side complements the weaknesses in two-factor schemes. The 
traditional identity-password table is replaced by a dynamic verification table to provide untraceability thus 
the user anonymity can be fully preserved. In addition, our scheme only adopts lightweight hash and biohash 
operations, which reduces the computational cost and communication cost in comparison with other related 
works. We also prove the proposed scheme to be semantic secure under the Real-or-Random Model. 
Therefore, the proposed scheme can meet the energy consumption demands and security needs of e-health 
systems successfully. 
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